This paper is about how to tender and contract a project consisting of interdependent tasks, allowing random events in the decision trees of the participants as well, about which the issuer need not know. We will show that the tendering system when the issuer foreshows that he will care only about his minimum possible payoff, that is he chooses the submissions and makes his decisions such way that maximizes this, then it will maximize his payoff, assuming competitive setting. The method enables to submit any well-defined submission and supports changing the conditions of the contracts during the process.
Introduction
Nowadays projects are planned by determining the timing, the deadlines and the penalties, choosing the applicants for the tasks, usually by tendering, and hoping that the tasks will be realized in time. In most cases this works, but usually not optimally, and sometimes it does not work at all. For example, a few years ago a country undertook to organize the Olympic Games. They wanted to build the Olympic Village by this kind of planning. But at about the beginning of the process, many tasks were late. That is why others could start their task only later. Although every contracted party knew that it made their work much more pressing for the Games, they considered this only as pressing as it was by their interest according to their contracts. Then, in the last year it became clear that many of the tasks would not be ready. Finally, the country organized the Games, but they had to take on huge extra expenses to finish the absolutely necessary tasks and had grievous loss by the tasks that have not been finished. This paper will be about the following question: how to plan it better?
To see the problem from another aspect, consider the following case. We want to get a project done by some companies that we have contracted with. At a particular time there are two companies working, A and B, and the others cannot start their tasks until both finish. This time, A tells that they may be ready earlier than they estimated before. We realize that as we can profit from an earlier completion, it would be better if B was ready earlier, too, even if this requires some extra cost. That is why we would ask B to work faster. It would be the right decision, but raises some questions.
How much money should we pay them at the end? What if A gets ready only at the original deadline? When we chose the companies to contract with, how could we have taken their willingness to make such optimization into consideration? This paper gives the answer for all such questions.
To handle the problem, the issuer, called Issuer has to have a real valued objective function that determines the utility of the possible outcomes of the works of all applicants. We want to choose the participants by tendering in order to get low prices. Of course we suppose that there is no total monopoly in any task, otherwise the tendering has no sense. Thus our goal is to post and evaluate the tenders in such way that
• the agents are intrested in telling the truth;
• if they tell the truth, Issuer gets the maximum payoff at the end.
Our method will allow the parties at any time to change the terms of their contracts in an automated way without disadvantage for anyone concerned.
In the case when the project consists of only one part, the optimal method is simple. Issuer tells his objective function and then the submissions are "if the utility of my work will be u then I will require u − x payment" (that can be negative), and by that Issuer's payoff will surely be x. Then Issuer chooses the submission with the greatest x. This guarantees that the interest of the applicant will be the same as the total interest, that is the interest in getting the greater utility minus total cost.
An equivalent description of this method is that each applicant can submit any well-defined submission, and Issuer chooses the one by which his minimum possible payoff is maximal. Essentially, this will be our method in the general case.
Issuer is absolutely mistrustful, so he only cares about his smallest possible payoff. He does not believe in the probabilities told by possibly lying applicants, but he accepts for example the following.
"We agree that if you say any x amount of money before our contingency point, then in the first case, we will pay you px, but in the second case you have to pay us (1 − p)x."
If the applicant has p probability to get the second case (and cares only about his expected payoff) then expectedly they do not come off badly by this offer. And if the second case is better for Issuer by m, that is in the second case he will get m greater payoff as in the first case, then he should choose x = m, because this way he will surely get the mean of the two payoffs with the weights of their probabilities, so he cannot come off badly even if the given probabilities are wrong. This way we assign responsibility for each unsure event to the liable party.
We will show that if Issuer foreshows that he will care only about his minimum possible payoff, that is why he will choose the x-es this way, then the best for the applicants will be to submit submissions corresponding to their real decision tree, and if they do so, Issuer gets the maximum expected payoff as a fix payoff.
Example for the method
We will consider a project that is very risky, but may gain huge utility. It consists of two tasks, one submission per task must be accepted, and if both succeed (in time) then Issuer will get a large sum of money, that is 60 here, but if either fails (is not ready in time) then making the other task will have no use. After getting all submissions, Issuer evaluates all pairs of them for the different tasks and accepts the pair producing him the most payoff. This example shows the evaluation of a pair.
The first two trees describe the two submissions in the following way. The different courses of the working process are the paths from the root to a leaf. The solid squares are the decision points, at which the appilcant can choose on which branch to continue. The other branching points are contingency points. Here which way to continue is chosen randomly with 1/2 probabilities for each branch. The big numbers denote asked payments called costs in the case of the corresponding branch. At the bottom S denotes the success and F the failure.
The first two trees describe the two submissions. First applicant asks 2 units of money beyond his expenses. His task is either started at the beginning with a cost of 5 and probability of the success of 1/2, or he makes preparations for the cost of 1, and later if Issuer wants he can try to complete the task for the cost of 6 with probability 1/2. In the other submission, the cost plus the desired expected payoff of the other task is 7 and the probability of the success is 1/2. The timing of the events are represented by their heights.
The third tree is a "product" of the two trees, that is it describes the aggregate process of the two processes. We can construct it by following the submissions by time, and creating an appropriate branching if it occurs in one of them, and then continue this on both branches. At the bottom S denotes both tasks succeeding, and F denotes either failing; and the number is the total payment asked by the applicants. We define the values of the endstates as 60 if both tasks succeeding and 0 otherwise, minus the total payments. We determine the values -denoted by italics -of all states from the bottom to the top. Values of states in a same edge are the same. The value before a decision point is clearly the maximum of the values after, as we choose the better decision. The value before each contingency point is the mean of the values after. It is agreed that the corresponding applicant have to pay the difference between the value after and before a contingency point.
This way Issuer surely gets the value of the starting state, because when the value of the current state changes then he always pays the difference. Each applicant gets the costs of his process, the asked extra payment and some random values with expected value 0.
For the first applicant this means that Issuer asks him -a bit surprisingly -to work by the second way, that is to make only preparations, and then Issuer either asks him to do nothing and Issuer pays him 3, or Issuer ask him to try it, and he gets 9 and ±30 for the risk, so he gets 39 if he succeeds, and he pays 21 if he fails. For the second applicant this means that he will get 12 besides his costs if he succeeds (that is 19 in total), but Issuer will deduct 12 from his payment (that is he should pay 5) in the case he fails. (We note that these extremly high risks are only the peculiarity of this simple and risky example and are not of the method.)
Besides this method chooses the best decisions, Issuer need not believe in the probabilities told by the applicants. Moreover, we will achieve that telling the full tree with the real probabilities are the best for the applicants.
The model
There are a player called Issuer and some other players called applicants. Issuer has a project in which every applicant can work if Issuer allows it him. The work of each applicant has some expenses, achieves some outcome and may have some randomness. We define their decision tree later. Issuer has an objective function that assigns real valued utility to the sets of outcomes of applicants. Issuer's payoff is this utility minus the (signed) money he pays. The payoff of each applicant is the money he gets minus the expenses of his work.
We assume that the applicants can communicate with Issuer, and they can make submissions and contracts as defined in Definition 2. This implies that outcomes and communication must be verifiable. We assume that Issuer can declare his strategy described later. We assume competitive setting between the applicants. (So they cannot make such contracts that violate the competition, for example forming a cartel.)
We assume that Issuer knows his objective function and each applicant knows his decision tree. We do not assume anything about the information the applicants have about the other applicants. That is each applicant may have any information about the information of others, and may get any such information during the process.
Our main goal
Definition 1 We define the payoff of the system as the sum of the payoffs of all players. The interest of the system or of a player means the interest in getting more expected payoff.
The payoff of the system is equal to the utility of the set of the outcomes minus the sum of the costs of the applicants.
Our goal is to make such agreements that makes the interest of each player the same as the interest of the system, at every decision of this player. The only exception is when Issuer chooses the applicants to contract with. Because for example, if an applicant offers to send Issuer some goods for 10, another for 9, then Issuer surely accepts the second offer, however if the costs of production are 7 and 8, respectively, then this is not the best choice for the system. Here Issuer chooses the best for himself, that is he chooses the set of submissions by which his expected payoff -that equals the expected payoff of the system minus of the applicants -is maximal. That is why, in fact, we will maximize the expected payoff of the system minus its previous kind of loss called the loss from the choice. Somewhat imprecisely, by maximizing the expected payoff, we will mean maximizing this difference.
The reason why this is we want to maximize is the following. Assuming that for each subtask of the project, the expected payoff of the chosen applicant for this task depends only on the task and the competition, these payoffs are essentially independent of the tendering system (considering fair tendering systems). And the loss from the choice is also assumed to be independent of the tendering system. Therefore Issuer's payoff is expected to be maximal if and only if the payoff of the system is maximal.
For this goal, providing the real expenses of each applicant in his submission must be in his interest. Moreover, we want that if an applicant submits a less precise submission and by this the system works with some errors, then the loss caused falls entirely on him, and has no effect on anybody else.
The decision tree
For each applicant we define his decision tree -describing all possible actions he can take in the courses of the task -as a rooted branching tree structure consisting of the following terms:
The inner nodes of the tree are of two kinds: the contingency points and the decision points. To each contingency point we assign probabilities to the edges leaving it. The third kind of nodes are the leaves. Each of them has an outcome and a cost assigned.
There is a time (an absolute point in time) assigned to every node, and for each edge the time assigned to the parent is not later then to the child.
The meaning of the tree is the following: the different courses of the process are the paths from the root to a leaf. In the case of a path, the outcome of the leaf is achieved at its time for the cost of the leaf. At a decision point, he can choose on which branch to continue. It describes his possible decisions for example choice of faster or cheaper shipment, number of employees, etc. At a contingency point, which branch to continue is chosen randomly with the probabilities assigned. This describes the effect of some random event such as an error, a failure of equipment, weather conditions, illness or simply faster or slower progress concerning the work. The time of this point is when he gets to know the outcome.
Random events of the decision trees of the applicants are assumed to be independent.
The tendering system
Definition 2 Communication is set of time stamped messages. Contract between Issuer and an applicant declares the payment to any pair of communication and outcome, meaning if the applicant achieves an outcome after a communication then Issuer has to pay the corresponding money. If it is negativethen the applicant has to pay.
Submission is a compulsory offer of an applicant for contract.
Issuer declares the following system in public and calls for tender for taking part in the project. After getting all submissions, he chooses the strategy that maximizes his minimum possible payoff; that is he considers all sets of submissions with all possible decisions of what messages he will send depending on his earlier communication with every applicant, he determines his minimum payoff in all cases, and chooses one by which this is greatest. This payoff is called the payoff from the submissions as a function of sets of submissions.
The fair strategy
We assign a prime cost submission to each decision tree in the following way. At any decision point the applicant chooses the branch Issuer asks for. At any contingency point he informs Issuer about which branch the process continues. Before the time of this contingency point, Issuer may assign some money to each branch such that their mean weightened by the probabilities is 0. At the end Issuer has to pay the cost of the leaf and all moneys assigned to the branches of the contingency points in which the process continued; and the applicant has to deliver the outcome corresponding to the leaf in time.
A submission that is the same as the prime cost submission but increased the costs of all leaves by the same value -that is the desired expected payoff -is called a fair submission. This increment is called profit.
Fair strategy of an applicant means submitting a fair submission, choosing the decisions corresponding to Issuer's choice at each decision point, and telling Issuer at each contingency point the branch corresponding to the effect of the random event. We will mean fair submission as the submission of an applicant with fair strategy.
Evaluation of fair submissions
A state of a submission means a point in time with a history of the not later communication and achievements of outcomes. In the figures of the examples, the states are the points of the graphs of the trees.
Issuer evaluates all subsets of the submissions, and accepts all submissions in one of the best sets. Consider the evaluation of a set.
We handle the submissions of the set in a combined submission that describes the aggregate process. Each state of this is the set of the states belonging to the same time of the single submissions. We can construct it by following the submissions, and creating an appropriate branching if it occurs in one of them, and then continue on all branches. We get the leaves as the combination of the appropriate leaves with the set of their outcomes. (So the combined outcomes are all the one-outcome-per-submission sets.)
The value of a state means Issuer's minimum payoff with his declared strategy if we start from this state, and forget the assignments to the earlier contingencies. We determine this starting from the leaves of the tree. The value of an endstate is the utility of the set of the outcomes, minus the total costs. Values of states in a same edge are the same. If the values after a decision point are given, the value before the point is their maximum, as Issuer will clearly choose the more favourable option. Now consider a contingency point. If the values of the cases are x 1 , x 2 , ...x n , and the weights given by the applicant are w 1 , w 2 , ...w n then the value of the state before the contingency point is their weightened mean x = w i x i , because w i (x i − x) = 0, so if Issuer assigns x i − x to the ith branch then he gets this expected payoff in all cases; and on the other hand the value after the random event is expectedly x and with any weighting of the branches he pays expectedly 0 more money, that is why his minimal payoff cannot be greater. Using these computations we can calculate the value of every state, including the starting point, which is Issuer's payoff. He gets it as a fix payoff.
Optimality of the tendering system
Issuer chooses the set of submissions by which the expected payoff of the system minus the expected payoff of the chosen submissions is maximal, because this is equal to Issuer's payoff.
Optimality of fair strategy
Theorem 1 If all accepted submissions are fair then the method chooses the decisions by which the expected payoff of the system is the largest possible.
Proof In this case the combined submission is a fair submission of the combined decision treedefined similarly -with the sum of the profits. The payoff of an applicant is his asked profit plus some random values with expected value 0. That is why their expected payoffs are independent of the decisions Issuer makes. Thus, at every decision the interest of the system is the same as Issuer's interest.
The payoff of the system is independent of Issuer's assignments at the contingency points, so we can assume that Issuer assigns the values in the prescribed way. This way Issuer's payoff is independent of the random events, so maximizing his minimum payoff is equivalent to maximizing his expected payoff that is Issuer's interest.
Interest in fair strategy
When we compare possible submissions of an applicant to find his best choice, we compare the cases when he submits one of them. For the sake of simplicity, we do not handle the case of ties, but we assume a strictly best combination of submissions.
Definition 3 The value of a submission is the payoff from all submissions constraining Issuer's strategies with he must accept this submission.
The value of any submission is at most the payoff from all submissions, with equality for and only for accepted submissions. Furthermore, a submission is accepted if and only if its value is greater than the payoff from all other submissions.
The value of a fair submission is the value of the prime cost submission minus the extra cost. So for a particular applicant there is exactly one fair submission with a given value.
Theorem 2 If every other submission is fair, then the fair submission of all possible submissions with the same value gains the most expected payoff for the applicant in the case of its acceptance.
Proof Consider the profits of the other applicants as constant costs. This way their submissions are considered to be prime costs. Consider a submission that is not fair, and which has been accepted. Compare this unfair case to the fair case when he applies with his fair submission of the same value. In the fair case the payoff of the system is not less because Theorem 1.
The expected payoff of every other applicant is always 0. Issuer's minimal payoff in the unfair case is the same as his fix payoff in the fair case, as his minimal payoff equals the value of this submission. So Issuer's payoff is not less in the unfair case. Hence, by exclusion, the loss the system suffers in the unfair case will damage this particular applicant.
Consequences
Increasing the cost in a submission yields more payoff in case of acceptance, but decreases the chance of acceptance, we do not deal with this issue here. What we need to see is considering the submissions with a given chance of acceptance, the fair submission yields the most expected payoff for the applicant in the case of acceptance.
Usually, submissions with the same chance for acceptance means something very similar to submissions that will have the same value, however its value depends on all submissions. For example, if there are submissions for the same task (that is exactly one of them must be accepted) and all other submissions are known then these determine the value of every possible submission for this task, so surely the more value of a submission for this task has, the more chance it has for acceptance. This shows the importance of Theorem 2.
We have not dealt with the case when several applicants tries conspire to circumvent the system. If applicants for one task join to get higher price, that is a problem of cartel, which clearly cannot be handled by such methods. But, on the other hand, if applicants for different tasks join together, then Theorem 2 applies to their coalition. Thus they cannot jointly benefit from this, so there is no incentive to join.
Conclusion
Using the method that Issuer foreshows he wants to maximize his minimum payoff, with some approximations which are reasonable in competitive setting, the best for the applicants is to be honest, and this way Issuer gets the most possible expected payoff as a fix payoff. More exactly:
• Using the approximation that the ordering of the chances of accepting the possible submissions will remain the same if we get to know all submissions of all other tasks, telling the truth is in the interest of all applicants, namely the expected loss caused by dishonest applicants falls entirely on them. (This approximation can be written in this simple form only in the case when we have to accept exactly one submission per task.)
• The expected payoff of each honest applicant depends only on his submission.
• If the applicants are honest then the expected payoff of the system will be maximal. Using the approximation that the payoffs that applicants for different tasks can expectedly get depends only on the task and the competition, this means that Issuer's expected payoff will be maximal. (We have assumed a much more reasonable assumption about the loss from the choice, as well.)
• If the applicants are honest then Issuer's payoff is fixed.
Appendix

Syntax of precedences
Consider the following example. Applicant A has to transport some material to applicant B, who cannot work without this material. In this case all outcomes of the decision tree of A must contain the delivery time t 1 , and of B must contain the time t 2 he uses the material first. We consider the cases when the precedence t 1 ≤ t 2 does not hold as possible cases but with −∞ as the value of the objective function. Of course, we must assume that B can recognize when A gets ready.
Modifications during the process
Formally, we exchange here the assumption that the applicants know their decision tree to a real life one that is making the more effort gives the more precise knowledge of their decision tree. We do not define the exact assumption but you can assume any real life one.
Assume that someone whose submission has been accepted can refine his decision tree during the process. It would be in the interest of the system to allow him to carry out such modifications.
The question is: on what conditions?
The answer is for us to allow modifications of submissions, if the applicant pays the difference between the values of the states with the original and the new submissions. From another point of view, considering the submissions with the restriction of the earlier communication, an applicant can exchange his submission to another one with the same value in the restricted mean. As it is shown above, exchanging to his really fair submission is in his interest, and his interest in the modifications is exactly the same as the interest of the system in them.
From another aspect this means that modifications are regarded as contingency points with 0 weights in the original submission, because such contingency points do not alter the value of the submission. Moreover, in no case could we forbid this, as an applicant can submit the submission form of "at every time in every case anything can happen with 0 probability".
It may happen that in the beginning it is too costly for some applicant to explore the many improbable branches of his decision tree, especially if he does not yet know whether his submission will be accepted. Later however, it would be worth exploring the ones that became probable. It is exactly this kind of in-process modifications that we would like to make possible. And in fact for the applicants, it is worth doing by the same schedule as the interest of the system would require, as we shall see below.
Since the expected payoff of an applicant who submits a fair submission is independent of the course of the other submissions, for a submission that is nearly fair, the small modifications of the other submissions have negligible effect. As the modifications of one applicant have no influence on Issuer's payoff and only this negligible influence on the expected payoff of other applicants, the change of the expected payoff of the system is essentially the change of his expected payoff. This confirms the above statement.
On the other hand, it is clear that if the objective function is somewhat modified, then everything can be rescheduled according to the new goals. Moreover, Issuer is also interested in describing his objective function in the same schedule as it is in the interest of the system. Of course the project should remain essentially the same.
Simplifications and the case with no parallel tasks
The messages Issuer sends depend only on the earlier messages he got. That is why if an applicant is sure that Issuer gets no message from anyone in the time interval I = [t 1 , t 2 ] then, without decreasing the value of his submission, the applicant can ask Issuer to send until t 1 his all messages that he would send until t 2 . Similarly, if Issuer surely sends no message during I then the applicant can send his messages he would send during I even at t 2 . Moreover, if Issuer surely does not communicate with anyone else during I then the applicant can ask Issuer to tell until t 1 what messages he would send in different cases in this interval, and the applicant can send his messages only until t 2 .
Consider a project that consists of two tasks, and the second task can only be started after the first one accomplished. The outcome of each applicant for the first task (called first applicant) consists of his completion time C 1 . The outcome of each second applicant consists of his starting time S 2 and the time C 2 he completes; and his decision tree starts with doing nothing until an optional point in time that will be S 2 , and then he can start his work. The objective function is f (C 2 ) for a decreasing function f : {time} → {money} if C 1 ≥ S 2 , and −∞ otherwise.
In this case Issuer always communicates with the applicant that is working at the time. So using the above observation, we will see simplified submissions with the same values as the fair submissions.
For each applicant for the first task this is "We ask h(C 1 ) − g 1 (h) money for any h : {time} → {money} that will be chosen by Issuer at the beginning", and for the second task this is "We ask f (C 2 ) − g 2 (S 2 ) money if we can start our work at S 2 and we will complete it at C 2 ". h(C 1 ) and f (C 2 ) describe the penalties, and the applicants choose g 1 and g 2 in such way that makes their expected payoff with their best strategy independent of the arguments. If all submissions are so then Issuer chooses a pair for which g 1 (g 2 ) is greatest. Then he chooses h = g 2 for the first applicant, and this way Issuer gets f (
In short, the applicants tell for how much money would they complete the first task depending on the penalty, and the applied penalty for the chosen second applicant is the loss form the delayed completion, and the penalty for the first applicant is howmuch more the second applicant asks if he can start later. Issuer chooses the pair that gains him the most payoff.
If a first applicant has no choice in his decision tree, that is his completion time C 1 is a random variable, then he has to choose g 1 (h) = E(h(C 1 )) − c, where E denotes expected value, and c is the cost plus the profit. In the general case he should determine the maximum of these functions depending on his strategies.
Note
My conjecture is that the assumption of Issuer can declare his strategy can be exchange to the assumption that the applicants can be sure that Issuer wants to maximize his expected payoff.
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Extensions for practice
I believe that this method is applicable in practice. This section is like an FAQ about this, and for those who has questions like "What if someone cares not his expected payoff?". It does not belong to the mathematical part of the paper.
Risk-averse applicants
Assume that an applicant has a strictly monoton goodness (utility) funcion g : R → R and he wants to maximize the expected value of g(payoff). Later we will see safety use of the case when g is concave.
Definition 4 We define a submission reasonable if he offers the same but with goodness instead of money. That is at the contingency points Issuer can assign goodnesses to the branches such that their weighted mean is 0. Then Issuer has to pay the money that modifies the goodness of the applicant by the assigned goodness.
By a reasonable submission, in the case of acceptance, the expected goodness of the money the applicant payoffs independent of Issuer's choices. If the submissions are reasonable then Issuer's payoff is fix. If the applicant is risk-neutral then the reasonable submission is fair. These are some reason why reasonable submissions works "quite good". We do not state that it is optimal in any sense, but a reasonable submission may be better than a fair submission.
We note that if g(x) = c 1 − c 2 e −λx then the evaluation works in about the same way as with fair submissions.
Stability
Let us investigate the extent of the error caused by a little inaccuracy in an accepted almost fair submission. As any two fair-type submissions can be easily extended to equivalent ones with identical tree structures with same outcomes, inaccuracies could be considered as errors in costs and weights. This way only these parameters in the combined submission are wrong. So all the things that can be doing badly are the decisions of the combined decision tree. Thus the expected loss is the expected value of the sum of the losses of the wrong decisions that is the sum of the differences between the right values of the states after the good and the chosen decisions.
A wrong decision will chosen if and only if the order of the values of its branches changes. A bit inaccuracy changes the values by at most proportional amount. Assuming that the considered submission is large and complex enough, this change is expectedly about proportional to the number of wrong decisions, and to the loss of each, too. Thus the expectation of the caused loss is only at most proportional to the square of the inaccuracy.
Notes and explications
Real submissions need not be presented in this form at all. As a computer have some elementary operations, which the user should not even know about, similarly this submission form is only a low-level language and a higher level language should be built on it.
We have supposed the independence of the chances of the contingencies in the model. But for events independent of the applicants -e.g. weather or the prime rate -this may not be the case. We can handle this by introducing a fictive agent whose submission consists of a multiple contingency that describes the distribution of the outcomes. In the submissions we replace the appropriate contingency points by decisions and define the objective function as −∞ if the appropriate decision does not chosen. The responsibility for the agent introduced this way can be taken by any party, for example Issuer after estimating the chances. The responsibility can even be shared between multiple parties.
It has strongly assumed that none of the chosen parties know better any part of the real decision tree of any other chosen party. Because for example, it may happen that an applicant A estimates the probability of an unfavorable event in his work to be 10%, but another one, called B knows that the chance is 15%, and he also knows that he has to proceed on two different decision branches in the two cases. If the submission of A is fair then B can increase the costs in his submission of the less probable case by 9x and decrease the costs in the other case by x. This way, he bets 1:9 with the other applicant on an event of 15% probability.
Because of this danger, A could rightfully say that larger bet can only be increased on worse conditions. Submitting reasonable submission with concave goodness function makes something similar, that is another reason to do it.
When we talk about prime cost we mean how much one could get from the money by investing it instead of contracting for this task. There are plenty of possibilities of getting profit from capital, which gives a rate of growth above which it is worth to invest, and below which it is not. So the prime cost corresponds to this rate of growth. Thus the extra profit above this is not so much.
We have not dealt with the timing of the payments. The change of the value of money can be easily handled. Otherwise if it is not indifferent when to pay, then it could be included in the objective function, which solves the problem.
In the objective function only the requirements could be stated precisely, but it is usually hard to say how much loss is caused by a non-exact outcome. So for example, if only a given p ratio of someone's mistakes can be proven, then the contract by which the applicant should pay 1/p times the proven loss should be made. Establishing an error can happen by the presently used system, that is, if Issuer notices an error, he states a claim for its determined value. The applicant either accepts this claim, or the amount of loss is established by court, and legal expenses are paid by the loser.
Considering the tendering problem in isolation, if a company simply wants to make an offer for co-operation with another company then we can easily show that the best for him is offering a fair submission.
Participants with limited funds
Consider a task that could cause great damage when done poorly. What shall we do with a submission of a company that has not enough funds to cover the damage? We should not accept this, otherwise every big company would create a small spin-off company to apply with it, to moderate the loss in case of failure. But even if we could exclude this, a submission with too little funds should not be accepted, because they would treat the danger less seriously. Someone is definitely needed who can take the whole responsibility.
Yet, it may happen that it is known that an applicant is reliable to some degree. But who knows it? If he has no funds, then he can say anything without responsibility; therefore it should not be taken into account. (Having funds can also mean that someone who has funds, even Issuer himself, takes the responsibility for our decisions. Advisory board is a usual example.) But someone who has enough funds, can offer to take the responsibility for example for an appropriate fee, maybe after making a suitable agreement with the applicant about the way of controlling. That is he can offer liability insurance. By this we get a submission which has this additional insurance fee, but we can be sure that the possible damage could be compensated. Nowadays this risk is usually taken by Issuer. This is also possible here; he could fill the controlling or the insuring part. But in this function we consider him a distinct party.
There are some other ways to get such applicants involved in the project, but considering their work as it requires control. Such contract should be made in which they only take some small ratio x of the liability, and besides this Issuer contracts another party for controlling. This party, besides a fixed fee, get the ratio x of the loss an error would have caused, if they discover and correct it, but have to pay its 1 − x ratio if they leave an error uncorrected. This way if they are able to correct an error with probability 1 − x, they could not come off badly, no matter how many errors the first party makes. And all this could be done on more levels, and the parameter x need not to be fixed in the tender announcement. It could be called for submissions with these parameters free. Of course this does not exclude any kind of negotiations used in practice. Any version of this method fits perfectly to our tendering system.
Of course one can not be sure that a company could pay the accidental damage, unless it puts an appropriate amount in deposit, which could not be expected. For this the conventional risk management -combined arbitrarily with the previous methods -can be used, which means again taking on the already mentioned insurance role. Thus, it should be made such a contract in that, if Issuer wants to get some x amount, the applicant agrees to pay the f (x), from which expectedly x would be actually paid. Clearly, when x is the expected worth of the company, f (x) is infinite, therefore proposals in that the loss to be paid is greater than this worth should not be accepted. Considering Issuer's risk-aversion, f could be even bigger. Of course determining f also involves responsibility, and can be handled by the method, but we omit the details.
Future improvements and research
A deficiency of the method is that, because of the large number of arising branches, the evaluation presented in the article is infeasible in practice. Actually it should be considered more as a definition than a practical algorithm. For the general case, when the structure of the trees are arbitrary, efficient algorithms are not expected.
An actual submission could contain even infinitely many branches, but it should have some compact representation, as it necessarily has some transparent structure. Because of this we can expect at least good approximating algorithms for this problem. Moreover, it is possible that we can specify some conditions on the structure of the submissions, which are usually satisfied, and by which efficient algorithms could be created. This should be probably the main area of further research. The above mentioned higher-level language of the submissions has to be made. For this the already existent tendering systems should be written in this language, as the goal is that creating a submission have to be as easy as possible. For example it is enough to give a description of a conventional decision tree only once, which describes that, with the progress of the work, one can make more precise estimate for the completion time, and possibly the work can be urged for extra expenses. After this an applicant only have to fill some parameters, which completes the time-related part of his submission.
